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THE RENTAL HOUSING CONVERSION
AND SALE ACT:
A PRACTITIONER'S ROADMAP TO
TENANT OWNERSHIP
Richard C. Eisen*
Rental housing in the District of Columbia is subject to a "comprehensive
scheme of regulation" 1 that is probably unique in its scope. One of the primary

anchors of that scheme is The Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act of 1980,
as amended (Act). 2 The purpose of this article is to examine the explicit

requirements of the Act and how it affects tenant and landlord rights. The article
will further discuss the use of the Act by tenants and their advocates to improve
housing conditions in all neighborhoods of the District.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE RENTAL HOUSING CONVERSION AND SALE Acr

The Act is divided into five titles. They will be addressed in the order in which
they are normally encountered: 1) Title IV on Sales, 2) Title II on Conversions, 3)
Title III on Relocation, 4) Title I on Purposes and Definitions, and 5) Title V on
Enforcement and Interpretation. 3
A.

Title IV.Opportunity To Purchase

Title IV of the Act requires that tenants be given an opportunity to purchase
before a rental unit or accommodation may be sold, discontinued from use, or

* At the request of Councilmembers John Wilson and John Ray, chief co-sponsors of the Rental
Housing Conversion and Sale Act of 1980 ("Act"), the author of this article co-chaired a committee of
attorneys who drafted the Act. The author has represented dozens of tenant organizations that have b-nefited
from the Act, advised other attorneys and taught seminars on the Act, been counsel in a majority of the
litigated cases construing the Act and, at the request of Councilmember Wilson, drafted the 1983
amendments to the Act. The Act was extended, effective September I1, 1993. At the request of
Councilmember Ray, the author drafted a 1993 amendments and extension bill. This bill, if adopted, %ill
resolve many of the issues discussed in Part III of the article. Much of this article represents opinions of the
author based on this extensive experience. All statements in the article not attributed to a spcific authority
are opinions of the author.
1. Hornstein v. Barry, 560 A.2d 530 (D.C. 1989).
2. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1601 et seq. (1981).
3. Regulations interpreting the Act are found at D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14. § 4700 (1989).
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demolished." The term sale includes a master lease of the property.0 An
opportunity to purchase includes an offer of sale that meets the requirements of
the Act and bargaining in good faith between the owner and the tenants.0 The
tenants may exercise their rights in conjunction with a third party.' They are
entitled to terms no less favorable than those agreed to by a third party.8 They are
also entitled to certain preferred provisions: minimum time deadlines (depending
on the number of units in the property) and a refundable earnest money deposit of
no more than five percent of the purchase price. 9
A tenant of a single family unit has thirty days from receipt of an offer to
submit a written statement of interest in purchasing. Upon submission of the
written statement, the tenant has an additional sixty days to negotiate a contract
of sale. The contract must allow the tenant at least sixty days to settle, with an
extension of up to at least ninety days (including the initial sixty), provided that a
lender submits a written statement of interest in financing within the initial sixtyday period.10
The tenants of a two-to-four unit accommodation are given fifteen days, as a
group, to submit a written statement of interest, and then up to ninety days to
contract. The contract must allow at least ninety days to settle with an extension
of up to at least one hundred twenty days (including the initial ninety). Once
again, this is contingent upon a lender providing a written statement of interest in
financing within the initial ninety-day period. If the tenants, as a group, fail to
submit their statement of interest, any "individual tenant" may submit a
statement within seven days after the expiration of the fifteen-day period.
Similarly, any "individual tenant" has thirty days to contract if the tenants,
jointly, fail to do so within the ninety-day period.'
Finally, in an accommodation of five or more units, the tenants must form and
register a tenant organization within forty-five days after receipt of an offer to

4. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1631 (1981).
5. See id. See also discussion infra p. 108.
6. See id. § 45-1632.
7. Id. § 45-1635. The term third party refers to any party other than the tenant or the owner.
Depending on the context, it refers to a party with whom the owner negotiates and/or contracts for purchase
of a rental housing accommodation or to a party with whom the tenants negotiate and/or contract for jointly
acquiring the accommodation.
8. Id. §§ 45-1634 to -1635.
9. Id. §§ 45-1634(b), -1638 to -1640.
10. Id. § 45-1638.
11. Id. § 45-1639.
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purchase.12 To register, the tenant organization must establish that it represents
tenants of a majority of the occupied units. If the organization timely registers, it
has at least one hundred twenty days to contract. The contract must allow the
tenant organization at least one hundred twenty days to settle with an extension of
up to two hundred forty days (including the one hundred twenty), provided that a
lender submits a written statement of interest in financing within the initial one
hundred twenty day period.1 3
In addition to these rights governing the tenant's opportunity to purchase, Title
1
IV provides tenants and tenant organizations a fifteen-day right of first refusal. '
The owner may extend the fifteen-day period and all other time periods for
negotiation and settlement set forth in Title IV, without incurring liability to any
third party 5
D.

Title II: Conversion Procedures

Title II governs conversions of rental housing to condominium or cooperative.
The basic rule is that rental housing may be converted only if a majority of the
tenants consent. The procedure for determining consent is normally through a
secret ballot election administered by the District of Columbia government.
Consent requires the vote of over fifty percent of the qualified voters. 10 Qualified
voters are those persons who meet the following criteria: (1) such voters are heads
of households, (2) at least one member of the household has lived in the unit for at
least ninety days prior to the election, and (3) no member has been employed by
the owner for at least one hundred twenty days prior to seeking eligibility to vote. 17
Finally, to be effective, the election must be free of coercion.' 8
Conversions may also be accomplished by three other limited means. First, if an
owner requests an election which is unopposed by any tenant or tenant
organization within forty-five days, the owner may then request, and the District
of Columbia government shall grant, a verification in lieu of election.10 Second,

12.
the offer,
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

If a tenant organization already exists in a form acceptable to the tenants at the time of receipt of
the tenant organization has only thirty days to register.
Id.§ 45-1640.
Id. § 45-1637.
Id. § 45-1633.
Id. § 45-1612(i).
Id. § 45-1612(d).
Id. § 45-1612(h).
Id.§ 45-1612(i).
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conversion to a low-yield cooperative, which means that appreciation of share
value is limited to a maximum of the annual rate of inflation, may be exempted
irom the election procedures upon application.20 The third and final conversion
procedure applies where a building that has been continuously vacant since
January 1, 1988, is classified as exempt from the election requirement. 21 A
building vacated later than January 1, 1988, must be reoccupied and converted
pursuant to one of the methods discussed above. However, a building does not have
to be reoccupied for conversion to a low-yield cooperative.
In addition to enumerating the procedural mechanisms for conversions, Title II
provides protection against evictions for certain tenants. If the head of the tenant
household is sixty-two years of age or older and the household annual income is
less than $40,000, the tenant cannot be evicted as a result of the conversion.
Furthermore, the rent cannot be raised by more than the annual cost of living
increase permitted under the rent control provisions of the Rental Housing Act of
1985.22 Any other tenant may be evicted if a conversion is approved, provided that
the tenant has first been given the initial opportunity to purchase the condominium
unit or the cooperative shares associated with his or her rental unit. After a
conversion is approved, the tenant must be given at least sixty days to purchase or
23
one hundred twenty days to vacate the unit (including the sixty days).
Finally, the converter generally must pay a conversion fee equal to four percent
of the purchase price of the unit or cooperative shares. The fee may be reduced to
as low as fifty dollars per unit, depending on the number of low income non-elderly
tenants in the accommodation, and the percentage of these tenants who buy or
lease the accommodation for a minimum period of five years. 2' The owner of a
converted unit leased to a low income tenant is exempt from property taxes on that
unit.2 5
C.

Title III: Relocation Assistance

Any tenant who is partially or totally displaced by a conversion is entitled to
relocation assistance, the cost of which is borne by the owner. The amount of

20. Id. § 45-1611(b).
21. Id. § 45-1618.
22. Id. § 45-2516(b).
23. See id. §§ 45-1615(b),(c), -2551W).
24. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14, §§ 4704.6 to .15 (1987).
25.

D.C. CODE ANN.

§ 45-1617

(1981).
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relocation assistance ranges from $125 to $500.20 Low-income tenants are also
entitled to housing assistance. Under the housing assistance provision, the District
of Columbia government must make payments to low-income tenants for three
years. The payment must equal the difference between the tenant's predisplacement and post-displacement rents, not to exceed specified maximum post27
displacement rents.
D.

Title I: Findings;Purposes; Definitions

Title I lists the underlying findings, purposes, and definitions regarding rental
housing conversion and sale.28 The Act's stated purposes are, to some extent,
contradictory: the Act intends both to preserve rental housing and to encourage
tenant-sponsored purchases and conversions. The unstated assumption seems to be
that tenant-sponsored conversions are less likely to cause displacement than those
initiated by building owners.
E. Title K. Implementation and Enforcement
There are three noteworthy aspects of Title V. First and most important is the
rule of statutory construction found in the Act; indeed, it is an extraordinary
rule.2 9 It states that "the purposes of this chapter favor resolution of ambiguity by
the. . . court toward the end of strengthening the legal rights of tenants or tenant
organizations to the maximum extent permissible under law." Second, Title V
grants an aggrieved owner, tenant, or tenant organization both a civil cause of
action and a right to an administrative hearing. Moreover, the prevailing party
may receive an award of attorney's fees in a civil action.30 Third, Title V provides
an administrative procedure for review, approval, and/or rejection of applications
under the Act, including conversion election procedures.31 Appeal from an
administrative action is made directly to the District of Columbia Court of
2
Appeals.1

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. § 45-1621.
See id. § 45-1623.
Id. §§ 45-1601 to -1603.
Id. § 45-1661. See also discussion infra pp. 106-108.
Id. §§ 45-1653, -1653.1.
Id. §§ 45-1654 to -1658.
Id. § 45-1659.
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II.

APPLICATION OF THE ACT TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
SCHEME OF REGULATION

In Part I of this article, the Overview begins with Title IV on sales because a
conversion by a current owner of a building is very unusual. Normally conversions
are carried out by a new owner. If the purchaser's plans are consistent with the
goals and desires of the majority of the tenants, the tenants may allow the sale to
proceed and vote in favor of the conversion. Tenants may object, however, to the
conversion and use the panoply of statutory rights to defeat a proposed purchase or
conversion and may move to purchase the building individually or collectively.
In order to obtain the required majority vote in favor of conversion and
permission to sell, the purchaser and/or seller usually will negotiate with the
tenants. The negotiations may yield offers to the tenants that do not relate directly
to the sale or conversion. For example, tenants may be offered money, a lower
purchase price for that tenant's converted unit, a long-term lease at fixed rents, or
a variation or combination of the above.
Typically, the purchaser first enters into a contract to purchase from the owner.
Settlement is contingent upon whether the tenants exercise their statutory
purchase rights. Either the purchaser or the tenant(s) may initiate negotiations
over the purchaser's plans. Alternatively, the tenants may attempt to purchase
with little or no contact with the contract purchaser. A third possibility is that the
owner will make an offer to the tenants prior to contracting with a third party.
This third approach is the least frequent because the owner may have to start
the whole process all over even if the tenants' rights expire. This situation arises
where 360 days 3 have passed from the day the offer was first made to the tenants,
but no third-party contract has been signed. Also, the sophisticated owner will
understand that making the offer to the tenants first constrains the negotiations
with a third party since the tenants must be offered terms and conditions no less
favorable than those agreed with the third party. Since the owner cannot know
what those terms are before there is a third party contract, the process with the
tenants may need to be started again if the owner finds it necessary to agree to
terms that are more favorable to the third party than those originally offered to
the tenants.
Notwithstanding the expected complications that may result from initial offers
to tenants, the tenants are often the most likely purchasers. Moreover, whether the
33. 180 days in the case of single family and 240 days in the case of two to four unit accommodations.
See id.§§ 45-1638(4), -1639(4), -1640(4).
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initial offer is to the tenants or a third party, the owner must ultimately negotiate
with the tenants. Thus it may be less burdensome and complicated to make the
initial offer to the tenants. This is particularly true for single-family houses where
the third party buyer typically desires to purchase for the buyer's own occupancy,
which requires coordinating the tenant purchase rights process with the process for
requiring the tenant to vacate. That coordination may be time-consuming and
uncertain.
Both the content and assertion of the tenants' statutory rights are substantially
the same regardless of how and when an offer to purchase is presented. With the
few exceptions noted in this article, individual tenants and tenant organizations
possess the same statutory rights. They may exercise their purchase rights,
resulting in the tenant organization becoming the owner. The tenant organization
may operate the property as rental housing; however, this is uncommon. The
tenant organization may also convert the property to condominium or cooperative
housing. Conversion typically follows a tenant organization purchase. The tenant
organization must follow the same conversion process required of individual or
independent owners/converters. Individual tenants have the same rights against a
tenant-organization owner/converter as against any other owner/converter.
A tenant organization may also purchase in conjunction with a third party: in
partnership, as joint owners, or as shareholders in corporate ownership. In
addition, a tenant or tenant organization may designate a separate entity to
acquire the property in exchange for specified benefits to the tenant or tenant
organization and its members.'
Tenant conversion and sale rights may also arise in circumstances that do not
appear immediately to implicate purchase offers. For example, a rent strike over
housing conditions may lead to a tenant purchase and/or conversion. In one
situation, a landlord owned two neighboring apartment buildings where the
majority of the tenants had been involved in a long-term rent strike. During the
life of the strike, substantial rents were paid into the court registry pending
resolution of the dispute. During that same period, however, little improvement
was made in the physical condition of the housing accommodation. Settlement of
the rent strike resulted in the tenants voting in favor of vacating one building and
allowing its conversion, in exchange for sale of the other building to the tenant
organization at an attractive price and with favorable owner financing. Both the
owner and tenant organization benefited from this settlement.

34. See discussion supra Part III.
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There are at least nine major variables which typically determine the fate of a
building. Those variables include (1) the income level of the tenants, (2) the rent
levels, (3) the acquisition price, (4) the building conditions, (5) the availability of
subsidy funds, (6) the neighborhood, (7) the vacancy/occupancy level, (8) the
nature of the owner, and (9) the level of tenant organization.
The first variable, the income level of the tenants, is critical to whether the
tenant organization can structure a purchase plan that will be affordable to its
members. The second variable, the rent levels prior to purchase, helps determine
what the tenants can afford after purchase. The third and fourth variables, the
acquisition price and the building conditions, essentially set the post-purchase
costs. If the building needs substantial renovation, the post-purchase costs will be
higher than if it needs limited or moderate rehabilitation.
Depending on the tenant income levels and the post-purchase costs, the fifth
variable, the availability of subsidies, may be critical to a successful purchase.
Because both the acquisition and conversion process require approval of a majority
of the tenants, a tenant purchase can only go through if it has the support of at
least a majority of tenants. Typically, a substantial majority is required.
Obviously, the ability of the tenants to afford the post-purchase costs is the critical
element in obtaining the consent of the required majority. The ability of the
majority of the tenants to afford the post-purchase costs is critical in structuring
any transaction that will result in the majority of tenants continuing to occupy the
property. That is true whether the transaction is structured as a direct tenant
purchase and conversion, a joint development with a developer, or through
designation of a third-party purchaser.
The sixth variable, the neighborhood, is a major factor both in setting the price
and in determining the potential interest of investors in assisting the tenant
organization to purchase. The seventh variable, the number of tenant occupants in
relation to the total number of units, also may greatly affect the ability to acquire
outside financing to keep the costs affordable to the current tenants. If the number
of occupied units is too low, the transaction may only be feasible if marketed to
new, outside purchasers. In that case, the only choice for the tenants may be to
designate a purchaser or to vacate in exchange for money.
The amount of money paid to those tenants who choose to vacate is, in turn,
affected by the character of the neighborhood and the estimated value of the
property. Tenants will be paid only as much as the prospective developer considers
reasonable in light of the long-term development potential and profit that can be
made from that building in that neighborhood in vacant condition. If the cost of
obtaining a vacancy is disproportionate to the level of risk and the long-term profit
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potential, the tenants will be unable to command large vacancy payments.
Payments may be as low as a few hundred dollars or as much as $30,000 or more
per tenant depending on these variables.
The eighth variable, the nature of the owner, is often a significant factor for a
variety of reasons. A long-term owner who has a history of positive relationships
with long-term tenants is more likely to view the sale in more than just business
terms. It is not unusual for such owners to make emotional or subjective decisions
that are not in their short-term financial interest merely in order to facilitate
purchase by the tenants. Similarly, if the owner is a nonprofit, public, or quasipublic entity, it may have corporate purposes, statutory requirements, or public
relation interests that are of greater concern than the monetary value of the sale.
Conversely, short-term speculators, heirs who recently acquired the property, or
other short-term owners may be principally concerned with the investment and its
potential to make money. This is particularly true of absentee owners who possess
little or no knowledge of the Act and resent the requirements imposed on them,
requirements that are not applicable to comparable properties they might own in
another jurisdiction.
The ninth and last major variable is the level of tenant organization. If the
tenants are poorly organized or unaware of their rights, they are not likely to
benefit from the panoply of rights provided by the Act. It is not uncommon for
tenants to fail to organize and respond at all to an owner's efforts to sell or
convert, thus allowing the sale to go forward without ever asserting their own
interests. Conversely, a well organized tenant organization can take full advantage
of all of its rights and help determine what ultimately happens to their homes.
Since the passage of the Act's predecessor in 1977, a network of programs and
services has developed to make tenant purchase a realistic option and not just a
nuisance to the normal operation of the rental market. The District of Columbia
government has developed an array of finance and subsidy programs that have
been critical to tenant purchase efforts. For example, the Home Purchase
Assistance Program has provided acquisition funds of up to $30,000 per unit that
do not have to be repaid so long as the property is occupied by lower-income, firsttime homeowners. 3 5 The First Right Purchase program also has provided
acquisition financing for tenant purchases.36 The Rental Rehabilitation program
has been made available for cooperative housing. Under this program, Section 8
housing assistance payment certificates are available to subsidize lower income

35. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14, § 2500 et seq. (1989).
36. Id. § 2700 et seq.
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members' monthly carrying charges.37
Complementing these programs is a network of professionals-development
consultants, architects, lawyers, contractors, and lenders-who specialize in tenant
purchases. The activity of nonprofit developers and lenders has also expanded
dramatically during the past thirteen years; much of their work has directly or
indirectly involved tenant purchase rights. In some cases, the nonprofits have
provided technical and financial assistanct, for tenant purchases. In other cases, the
nonprofit developers function as the designated purchasers and converters at the
request of the tenant organizations. The combination of financing and subsidy
programs earmarked for tenant purchase, together with the availability of
professionals specializing in the unique problems and issues involved in making
tenants into homeowners, has resulted in widespread success among thousands of
tenants in the District of Columbia since initial passage of the Act.

m.

SPECIAL ISSUES IN USING THE

Acr

The discussion in Part II of how the Act affects real-world negotiations over
purchase and sale of apartments in the District of Columbia raises several
important unanswered questions. These issues include: 1) the standard for
"bargaining in good faith"; 2) whether, and to whom, tenants may assign their
rights; 3) the sale of partnership and corporate interests; 4) foreclosures; and 5)
the comparison between individual tenant rights and those of a tenant
organization.
A.

Bargainingin Good Faith

The Act requites the owner to bargain in good faith. The statutory language,
however, provides examples of what is not bargaining in good faith without
providing an explicit statement of what is good faith bargaining.
(a) Bargaining in good faith. The tenant and owner shall bargain in good
faith. The following constitute prima facie evidence of bargaining without
good faith:
(1) The failure of an owner to offer the tenant a price or term at least as
favorable as that offered to a third party, within the periods specified in
37.

24 C.F.R. 511 (1992).
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sections 45-1638(4), 45-1639(4), and 45-1640(4);

(2) The failure of an owner to make a contract with the tenant which
substantially conforms with the price and terms of a third party contract
within the time periods specified in sections 45-1638(4), 45-1639(4), and
45-1640(4), respectively, without a reasonable justification for so doing;
or
(3) The intentional failure of a tenant or an owner to comply with the
provisions of this subchapter.3 8
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has addressed the issue of bargaining
in good faith only twice--once under the predecessor law, and once under the Act.
In Columbia Plaza Tenants Association v. Antonelli,30 the court analyzed,
under the predecessor act, a conveyance of an apartment complex to a third
party.4 0 The tenant association opposed the conveyance and sought to purchase the
apartment complex as a group. In the negotiations, the owners refused to grant
the tenants some terms that were granted to the third party. The major term that
the court considered was a requirement that the Columbia Plaza Tenants
Association provide assurances of its ability to perform before the owner would
enter into a contract. The court rejected the argument of the tenant association
that the five percent earnest money deposit provision of the Act was "an exclusive
exposition of the financial assurances an owner may reasonably seek from a tenant
organization. ' ' 4 1 The court held that the owners could seek financial assurances
from the tenant association in good faith.4 2
In Columbia Plaza, however, the court was analyzing the predecessor to the
Act. The Act provides a specific time period for the tenant organization to seek
and obtain financing and has the expansive rule of statutory construction discussed
in Part IV. Therefore, it seems clear that the Act precludes an owner from
requiring proof of financial ability to perform before entering into a contract. 3
However, it does seem likely that Columbia Plaza is still good law with respect to

38. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1634 (1981).
39. 462 A.2d 433 (D.C. 1983).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 439.
42. Id.
43. In Redmond v. Birkel, 797 F. Supp. 36 (D.D.C. 1992), the U.S. District Court held that "plaintiffs'
financial 'capacity was not relevant to defendants' burden of giving notice." Id. at 40. This holding is
completely consistent with the Act precluding an owner from requiring proof or financial ability to perform
prior to entering into a contract.
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an owner being able to require financial assurances if the contract provides for
owner-financing. In other words, the tenants must be able to establish, through
their own resources or through a partner's resources, that their financial credit
worthiness is at least comparable to that of the third party. 4" If the tenants can
meet that requirement, then the owner has an obligation to provide comparable
owner-financing to the tenants. This requirement can be incorporated into the
contract, but the tenants should not be required to name a guarantor until
settlement, i.e., until the statutory time period for obtaining financing expires.
Columbia Plaza is probably still good law to the extent that it is consistent with
Lealand Tenants Association, Inc. v. Johnson45 and Green v. Gibson,'0 which
construed the issue of bargaining in good faith under the Act. In Lealand, the
owner made an initial offer with only two material terms: a fixed price, and
payment in cash. 47 Subsequently, a third-party contract was executed which met
the same requirements. The owners then demanded identical subsidiary terms for
the tenant association as had been agreed upon with the third party. The court
rejected the association's "contention that it was impermissible for the owners to
take into account any of the terms of the [third party] contract in the course of
negotiations during the statutorily required period, rather than consider only the
48
owners' initial offer of sale."'
In Green, the tenant made an initial offer to purchase the single-family property,
but the owner removed the property from the market. A few months later, the
owner made an offer to the tenant. What happened next was somewhat in dispute.
Offer and counteroffers were exchanged, but the owner and tenant did not enter
into a contract before the owner entered into a contract with a third party. The
tenant sued on claims of the owner failing to bargain in good faith and failing to
honor the Act's additional right to first refusal. The court reversed the summary
judgment granted to the owner on grounds that the issue of bargaining in good
faith "presents an issue of mental state somewhat akin to disputes in which intent
is an issue," and summary judgment should be granted in such cases only
sparingly. 9 The court held further that the additional right of first refusal
specifically includes "the obligation of good faith contained in sec 45-1634."5 0
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See discussion supra pp. 96-97.
572 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1990).
613 A.2d 361 (D.C. 1992).
572 A.2d at 432.
Id. at 433-34.
613 A.2d at 364.
Id. at 365.
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Finally, the court held that exercise of the right of first refusal requires "only
substantial conformity, rather than absolute identity or perfect match, between the
tenant's exercise of the right and the third party offer."51
In Columbia Plaza, the court considered the third-party contract a "blue print"
for negotiation. 2 It did not permit the tenant association a right of first refusal on
those precise terms. Nor did it absolve the partnership (owner) from responsibility
to negotiate in good faith.5 3 In Lealand, upon consideration of the relationship
between the Act's statutory negotiation period" and the additional right of first
refusal,55 the court's conclusion was consistent with the Columbia Plaza analysis
of the predecessor act, which did not include a specific right of first refusal
provision for multifamily accommodations.
In our view, however, a reasonable interpretation of D.C. Code section 451637 is that when a third-party contract is received by the tenant organization
after negotiations have begun, it is at least permissible for the owners to ask
for subsidiary terms-i.e., non-material terms-similar to those offered by the
third party. If the owners, acting in good faith, and the tenant organization
are still unable to reach an agreement at the end of the negotiation period, the
third-party contract becomes primary, but the tenant organization has the
protection of a 15-day right of first refusal.50
In other words, Columbia Plaza, Lealand and Green, generally mean that an
owner can meet the bargaining-in-good-faith standard by requiring that the tenant
agree to the same, or functionally equivalent, terms as those agreed upon by the
third party.
B.

Assignment of Tenant Rights
D.C. Code section 45-1635 reads as follows:
The tenant may exercise rights under this subchapter in conjunction with a
third party. The tenant may assign his or her rights under this subchapter to

51. Id. at 366.
52. 462 A.2d at 437.
53. Id. at 433.
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1638 to -1640 (1981).
55. Id. § 45-1637.
56. 572 A.2d at 434; Supra note 2.
54.
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an agency or instrumentality of the District or federal governments.5 7
An initial interpretation of this section may seem to permit tenants (or tenant
organizations) to purchase in a partnership or joint ownership, but to assign their
purchase rights only to the District of Columbia or federal government. This was,
in fact, the result in In Re Kirk.58 Two other Superior Court cases, Neptune, Inc.
et al. v. Keroes, et al, 59 and Cardwellv. Lomont,6 0 and one United States District
Court case, Government of Jamaica v. 1201 29th Street, N.W. Tenants
Association, Inc. et al.,"' however, held that tenants may, in effect, designate who
will purchase the property. The latter three decisions were much more thoroughly
argued and considered decisions.
In Neptune, where a tenant organization entered into partnership with a
developer, the tenant organization held only a nominal partnership interest, which
it was obligated to sell to the developer immediately after settlement. The
developer was obligated to maintain the property as rental housing with no
extraordinary rent increases for at least three years after closing. The court held
that the "exercise ... in conjunction" language of the statute was broad enough to
allow the arrangement at issue and that the assignment language did not
specifically prohibit an assignment to a non-government party.62 The court also
distinguished between an assignment of a contract that the tenants had negotiated
(as was the case in Neptune) and an assignment of tenant rights to negotiate a
contract. The latter is what is referenced in the statutory provision.63 The court
also considered the continuing rental after purchase to be an important factor,
64
because it demonstrated compliance with one of the statutory purposes.
In Cardwell v. Lomont, the tenant's right to designate a purchaser was
expanded further. In that case, the tenant in a single-family house assigned her
right to negotiate to a third party in exchange for payment of a minimal amount
of money to vacate after the sale. When the third party challenged the owner's
right to sell to the tenant's designee, the tenant presented the court with excerpts
from the Council debate on the Act that made it very clear that the Council

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1635 (1981).
No. 129-79 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1989).
No. 895-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1986).
No. 90-3469 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1990).
No. 92-0836RP (D.D.C. April 7, 1992).
Neptune, No. 895-86, slip op. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 25.
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anticipated that tenants could and would sell their rights under the Act to third
parties for money. While the debate concerned only conversion rights, the tenant
argued that the tenant's right to sell conversion rights logically applied to tenant
purchase rights as well. The plaintiff, a third-party purchaser, asserted that the
tenant's argument, if it prevailed, would create a "futures market in tenant's
statutory rights." 65 Nonetheless, the court granted summary judgment for the
tenant. 66
In Jamaica,the government of Jamaica sought an order restraining the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation from conveying a rental property to the
government of Mongolia, the party designated to purchase the property. The court,
citing all three Superior Court decisions referenced above, concluded that the Act
07
did not prevent the association from designating Mongolia as the purchaser.
Thus, while the Court of Appeals has not yet addressed the tenant's right to
assign rights under the Act, it seems likely that the court would agree with the
Neptune, Cardwell, and Jamaica courts, that tenants have wide discretion in
designating who may purchase a rental housing accommodation in exercise of
tenants' rights under the Act.
C. Sale of Partnershipor Corporate Interests
The Act does not define the term "sale." The absence of a definition of "sale"
raises the question whether the sale of all, or a controlling share of, interests in a
partnership, or shares of stock in a corporation, triggers tenant purchase rights
where the partnership's or corporation's sole asset is a tenant-occupied
accommodation. The issue has never been litigated, but the conventional wisdom is
that such a sale does not trigger tenant purchase rights. 8 The significance of this
conventional wisdom is that transactions are routinely structured on the basis of
this conventional wisdom, i.e., sellers of corporate shares or partnership interests
do not typically attempt to comply with tenant purchase rights.
The conventional wisdom that a sale of such an interest does not trigger tenant

65. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
of Defendants Nesbit, Lomont, Cook, Ricks, Mowbray and Mowbray Associates, Inc., and in support of
Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at 25, Cardwell, No. 90-3469.
66. Order in Cardwell.
67. Jamaica, No. 92-0836, slip op. at 7.
68. See Williamson v. Sealander, No. 4169-85, (D.C. Super. Ct. July 31, 1985). Superior Court Judge
Steffin W. Graae held that sale from a family-owned corporation to the family did not constitute a "sale"
within the meaning of the Act.
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purchase rights is based primarily upon the Rental Housing Conversion and Sale
Act of 1980 Amendments and Extension Act of 1983.69 Among the proposed
amendments to the Act in D.C. Bill 5-162 was section 3(g), which specifically
defined "sale" to include sale of partnership or corporate interests. However, at the
hearing on the bill, the Barry administration opposed the provision on two
grounds."0 First, it was contended that such sales were not occurring and,
therefore, there was no problem to correct. Second, it was contended that there
would be no practical way to monitor violations because at that time sale of such
interests did not have to be recorded with the recorder of deeds or any other D.C.
government agency. (Since then, transfers of economic interest in real property
occurring after September 30, 1989, must be recorded with the recorder of deeds
and are subject to a recordation tax). 71 As a result of the administration's
opposition, the proposed amendment to the original Rental Housing Conversion
and Sale Act was deleted by the Council. Thus, it appears that sale of partnership
or corporate interests do not trigger tenant purchase rights.
At the hearings on the "Tenant Opportunity To Purchase Clarification Act of
1989,"72 this issue was discussed at length. The Chairman of the Council's
Committee on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, Councilmember John Ray,
stated his position that sales, if they circumvent tenant rights to purchase, are in
fact violations of the Act, thus challenging the conventional wisdom. As noted
above, the issue has yet to be litigated or clarified by the Council.
D. Foreclosures
A similar question has arisen about whether tenant purchase rights are triggered
by a foreclosure sale. Again, the conventional wisdom is that a foreclosure sale
does not trigger those rights and, as a result, tenants typically are not afforded
purchase rights pursuant to the Act in connection with foreclosure sales. This
conventional wisdom is based on 1372 Kenyon Street N.W. Tenants Association v.
Roger Washburn, et al.7 The court essentially concluded that granting tenants
purchase rights at a foreclosure sale would significantly change lender expectations
69. D.C. Law 5-38, 1983 D.C. Stat. 119.
70. Letter from John Ray, Councilmember, to Marion Barry, Mayor of the District of Columbia (May
16, 1983); testimony of Carol B. Thompson, Director, Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs 5
(May 23, 1983).
71. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-923(a)(1) (1981).
72. D.C. Law 8-49, 36 D.C. Reg. 5790 (1989).
73. No. 15046-80 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 1980).
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in the absence of specific legislative direction supporting such a right. However,
the decision predates Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine' and the
cases that have followed, which have changed lender expectations considerably by
requiring a foreclosure purchaser to be an "involuntary" landlord of tenants in an
7
accommodation on which the underlying deed of trust has been foreclosed
Nonetheless, Kenyon Street is the only case that has been litigated to date on this
issue, and the Council has enacted no change in the Act concerning foreclosures 7 0
E. Individual Tenant Versus Tenant Organization Rights
The tension between the rights of individual tenants and of tenant organizations
poses some confusion. A purchase by a tenant organization involves two distinct
sets of rights-the rights of the tenants, collectively and as individuals. A tenant
organization rarely, if ever, will satisfy all of the tenants. Disputes between
individual tenants and the tenant organization are common. Conceptually, it is
easier to focus on the different sets of rights by remembering that a tenant
organization has a separate, legal, corporate identity. The tenant organization
must provide individual tenants an opportunity to purchase their units as
condominiums or as cooperative shares. Individual tenants have the same
purchase, relocation, and continuing rental rights as against the tenant
77
organization as they do against any other owner.
Normally, the tenant organization promises its members a "better deal" than
what the Act would otherwise require, so long as the members comply with the
tenant organization's membership requirements. This common practice was
approved by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Raskausas v. Temple
Realty Co.7 8 In this case a former member of a tenant association sued the
association because the association prevented the plaintiff from purchasing two
converted condominium units. His entitlement to purchase was based on his
membership, which was revoked. The court held that the association may establish

74. 490 A.2d 1165 (D.C. 1985).
75. Id. at 1170. An involuntary landlord means that the lender who foreclosed on the loan to the
landlord solely to recover defaulted loan funds, is required to comply with all of the District's complex rental
housing laws once the lender has acquired the property through the foreclosure sale. In this way, the lender
has become an involuntary landlord.
76. Presumably, similar arguments would apply with respect to rental properties sold through the
property tax sale process.
77. See supra pp. 91-93.
78. 589 A.2d 17 (D.C. 1991).
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reasonable membership rules that go beyond any specific provisions in the Act and
may revoke the membership and the attendant privileges based on its bylaws.79
In Stanton v. Gerstenfeld, et al.,80 the Court of Appeals confirmed that, once a
tenant organization representing the tenants of a building with five units or more
has successfully registered pursuant to D.C. Code section 45-1640, the tenant
organization "is the sole entity that can conduct" negotiations with the owner; and
"it is only to the tenant organization that the owner owes any duties under the
statute. .

.

.[I]t is only the tenant organization that is 'aggrieved' as that term is

used in section 45-1653, and, therefore, it is only the tenant organization that can
bring a civil action against the owner under the statute." 81 Any interpretation that
would allow individual tenants to challenge the tenant organization's negotiations
'82
with the owner "could lead to an unworkable chaos of litigation.
The District of Columbia Council held hearings on PR 9-37, "Aggrieved Tenant
Right to Remedy Resolution of 1991," which would have effectively overturned
the court's decision in Stanton. However, the proposed resolution died in
Committee on a 5-0 vote on April 9, 1991. A range of tenant advocates strongly
supported the Stanton decision and encouraged the Council to kill PR 9-37.
IV.

THE

ACT'S

RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Act provides for ambiguities that may arise. D.C. Code section 45-1661
provides guidance in the resolution of ambiguities: "The purpose of this chapter
favors resolution of ambiguity by the hearing officer or a court toward the end of
strengthening the legal rights of tenants or tenant organizations to the maximum
extent permissible under law." Thus, the District of Columbia Council has made
explicit its intent that disputes under the Act presumptively should be resolved in
favor of the tenant. The normal rule of statutory construction is that a statute in
derogation of common law must be strictly construed. 83 However, the Act has its

79. Id. at 24-25.
80. 582 A.2d 242 (D.C. 1990).
81. Id. at 245 (footnote omitted). Individual tenants do, however, retain the right to sue prior to the
registration of the tenant organization, i.e., individual tenants can challenge the failure of an owner to give the
tenants the initial offer and the opportunity to form a tenant organization and register. Redmond v. Birkcl,
797 F. Supp. 36, 39-40 (D.D.C. 1992).
82. 582 A.2d at 245.
83. Columbia Plaza, supra pp.101-103 and note 39, construed the predecessor to the Act, section
602(b) of the Rental Housing Act of 1977.
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own express rule of statutory construction, quoted above.
A stronger and clearer expression of the Council's intent is hard to imagine.
Rephrased, in order for a court to determine that a tenant or tenant organization's
position is wrong, the court must determine that the Act unambiguously prohibits
that position. To bolster the contention that the Act should be construed as
broadly as possible in favor of a tenant or tenant organization, a court should look
at the Act as a whole and to the expansive rights that the Act grants tenants and
tenant organizations.
The Act can be understood best in the historical and legislative context in which
it was enacted. The statutory right of tenants to purchase their homes before sale
to a third party was established by Section 602(b) of the Rental Housing Act of
1977 (RHA). The RHA did not explicitly enunciate any statutory purpose behind
Section 602(b), and difficulty in interpreting the statute arose as a result of the
"inartful language" used. 84
In fact, a series of cases decided in 1979, and early 1980, construed various
confusing aspects of Section 602(b), such as (1) whether offering tenants a price
higher than that offered to a third party constitutes bargaining in good faith;85 (2)
whether a landlord can unilaterally extend the negotiation period without the
concurrence of a third party contractor, and what constitutes bargaining in good
faith;86 (3) whether a right of first refusal applies to multifamily buildings and
when the time period commences; 87 and (4) whether the tenants may designate
another purchaser to act on their behalf.88 The cited cases construe tenants' rights
narrowly and restrictively.
The Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act was enacted a short time later, on
June 27, 1980. The Act was a comprehensive effort by the D.C. Council and the
Mayor to address the problem of tenant displacement as a result of sale and
conversion of rental housing. The Council was conscious of how the courts had
interpreted its prior legislative enactments addressing the problem of tenant

84. See Daon Corporation v. Columbia Plaza Limited Partnership. No. 11825-79 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan.
14, 1980).
85. 520 E Street, N.E. Tenants' Association, Inc. v. Mary E. Wise. et. al.. No. 9164-79 (D.C. Super.
CL Aug. 13, 1979).
86. See Daon Corporation v. Columbia Plaza Limited Partnership. No. 11825-79 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan.
14, 1980).
87. 2800 Wisconsin Avenue Tenants Association v. Herbert M. Gelfend. No. 10737-79RP (D.C. Super.
Ct. Sept. 14, 24, 1979).
88. Eton Towers Tenants Association, Inc. v. Interstate Federal Savings and Loan Assoiation. et al..
No. 10571-79 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 1980).
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displacement, including Section 602(b) of the RHA.
The problems that the Act addressed, and some of the earlier legislative
responses, were detailed in Title I, which has been codified at D.C. Code section
45-1601. The purposes of the Act were also enumerated in Title I at D.C. Code
Section 45-1602. The primary purposes were "[t]o discourage displacement of
tenants through conversion or sale of rental property, and to strengthen the
bargaining position of tenants toward that end . . .; [and] [t]o preserve rental

housing which can be afforded by lower income tenants in the District."8 9
These and the related statutory purposes are addressed by a number of
mechanisms and controls found in Titles II, III and IV of the Act. As described in
Part I of this article, Title IV of the Act, the successor to Section 602(b) of RHA,
mandates that tenants be given "an opportunity to purchase the accommodation"
prior to sale to a third party. 90 In detailing the tenants' rights to purchase, the
Council addressed each of the issues raised in the 1979-80 series of cases
construing Section 602(b). 1 The resolution of each of the issues favored the
strengthening of tenant rights. In fact, the whole thrust of the Act consistently has
been to expand tenant rights.
In 1983 the original Act expired but was renewed for five more years by The
Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act of 1980 Amendments and Extension Act
of 1983. In the 1983 Act, the Council found in Section 2 that the housing crisis
that justified the initial passage of the Act had "not substantially improved," but
that the Act had "generally been successful in meeting its stated purposes," and
should be extended for five years with amendments to address minor problems that
had been identified. Again, the thrust of the amendments was to further expand
and clarify tenant rights. In July 1988 the Act was extended a third time, until
June 1, 1993.2

The most recent amendment of the Act was the Tenant Opportunity To
Purchase Clarification Amendment Act of 1989.' 3 This Clarification Act defined
the term "sale" in D.C. Code section 45-1631 to include a master lease, which has
the effect of transferring effective control of the property from the owner to a third
party. The Clarification Act was made retroactive in its effect. The retroactive
provision was held unconstitutional in District of Columbia, et al. v. George
89. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1602(1), (2) (1981) (emphasis added).
90. Id.§ 45-1631(a).
91. See Id.§§ 45-1632, -1633, -1634(a), -1635, -1637, -1653, -1661.
92. 35 D.C. Reg. 7449 (1988). It is anticipated that the Act will be renewed again before it expires on
June 1, 1993.
93. 36 D.C. Reg. 5790 (1989).
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Washington University, et al., as an impairment of a prior contract obligation
and as an ex post facto law. The appeal is currently pending with the D.C. Court
of Appeals.
The only other constitutional challenges to any provision of the Act were
unsuccessful. In Hornstein v. Barry"5 and Silverman v. Barry,", the courts held
that the tenant consent requirement for conversion from rental to condominium or
cooperative does not violate the U.S. Constitution. The consent requirement was
challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of authority to private parties, but
both courts held that this statutory scheme was within the District government's
power to enact.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act is a primary anchor of the
District of Columbia's "comprehensive scheme of regulation" of rental housing. It
provides a wide range of statutory rights that tenants and their advocates have
parlayed into a significant number of successful "tenant purchases" that have run
the gamut of possible structures. The common denominator has been that the Act
has provided tenants opportunities to improve their lives, which would not have
been available in its absence.

94. No. 88-11983 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 7, 1991).
95. 560 A.2d 530 (D.C. 1989).
96. 845 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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